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COMMENTS
WISCONSIN'S "GOOD SAMARITAN" STATUTE
On June 10, 1963, Wisconsin joined at least twenty-three other
jurisdictions in granting legislative protection to doctors who treat
victims in emergency situations.1 Section 94 of the Wisconsin Laws of
1963 reads as follows:
An act to create 147.17(7) and 149.06(5) of the statutes, relating to exempting doctors and nurses from civil liability for
emergency treatment at the scene of an emergency.
Section 1. 147.17(7) of the statutes is created to read:
147.17(7). No person licensed under this section, who in
good faith renders emergency care at the scene of an emergency,
is liable for any civil damages as a result of acts or omissions
by such person in rendering the emergency care.
For the purposes of this subsection, the scene of an emergency shall be those areas not in the confines of a hospital or
other institution which has hospital facilities or a physician's
office.
Section 2. 149.06(5) of the statutes is created to read:
149.06(5). No person registered under this section, who in
good faith renders emergency care at the scene of an emergency,
is liable for any civil damages as a result of acts or omissions
by such person in rendering the emergency care.
For the purposes of this subsection, the scene of an emergency
shall be those areas not in the confines of a hospital or other2
institution which has hospital facilities or a physician's office.
Read literally, the foregoing sections grant immunity from civil liability
to doctors and nurses 3 who, in "good faith," treat victims of accidents
at the scene of the emergency. In effect, this statute deprives a patient
treated under emergency conditions of any right he may have had to
recover from a doctor or nurse for additional damages arising from
negligent treatment.
Generally, acts which take away an individual's rights are justified
4
on the ground that they are required by the overall public welfare.
Statutes of this nature have been enacted in Alabama, Arkansas, California,
Connecticut, Georgia, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Wyoming, and Virginia.
2 Wis. Laws 1963, ch. 94.
3 Those licensed under Wis. STAT. § 147.17(7) (1961) are engaged in the practice of medicine and surgery, and those licensed under Wis. STAT. § 149.06(5)
(1961) are engaged in nursing.
4When a legislature enacts a law of this nature, it acts under its so-called
police power. Statutes that limit or abolish common-law rights of action have
been sustained as a permissible exercise of the police power to correct abuses
and evils arising out of a growing multiplicity of suits contrary to the public
welfare. Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117 (1929). In regard to the abolition of
the action for breach of contract to marry, see Lebohm v. City of Galveston,
154 Tex. 192, 275 S.W. 2d 951 (1955).
1
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The rising number of automobile accidents has created a problem of
grave public concern, which makes it necessary that the victims of
these accidents be given proper treatment. The apparent purpose of
this statute is to provide for the public welfare by encouraging doctors
and nurses to render emergency care to accident victims at the scene
of the accident. The individual rights of a portion of our society (people
negligently treated at the scene of an accident) have been suspended
in order to provide others (namely, all accident victims) with the protection that is demanded by the general public welfare.
Necessity of the "Good Samaritan' Law
Before discussing the application of this new statute, it seems imperative to inquire as to whether or not the new law is actually necessary. The apparent reason for its enactment is to encourage doctors and
nurses to stop at accident scenes and render emergency care. From this
it could be inferred that, as the law exists today, doctors and nurses
are not given adequate protection from liability. If the latter is not the
case, then the law is unnecessary. The question is, then, would a doctor
who treated a victim of an accident have exposed himself to the risk
of a malpractice suit under the law as it existed prior to the enactment of the "Good Samaritan" statute.
The common-law rule is that one is required to exercise that degree
of care and skill which would be required of an ordinary reasonable
man acting in like or similar circumstances. 5 This common-law rule
has been interpreted to mean that a doctor is under a duty to exercise
the same degree of care which other doctors of the community would
exercise in the same or similar circumstances. The Wisconsin court
has long accepted and applied the rule that
•. .a physician is required to exercise only the degree of care,
diligence, judgment, and skill which other physicians of good
standing of the same school or system of practice usually exercise
in the same or similar localities under like or similar circumstances, having due regard to the advanced state of medical practice at the time in question.'
This general rule of conduct has been subjected to some modifications
in order to protect doctors acting under special circumstances. Generally, a physician is not required to exercise the same amount of prudence, judgment, and discretion in an emergency as he must under normal conditions." Thus, when a doctor has acted in an emergency situTORTS §283 (1934).
rHaggerty v. McCarthy, 344 Mass. 136, 181 N.E. 2d 562 (1962).
7 Kuechler v. Volgman, 180 Wis. 238, 242, 192 N.W. 1015, 1017 (1923). This
rule was also applied in: Nelson v. Harrington, 72 Wis. 591, 40 N.W. 228
(1888) ; Wurdemann v. Barnes, 92 Wis. 206, 66 N.W. 111 (1896) ; Marchand
v. Billin, 158 Wis. 184, 147 N.W. 1033 (1914); Hrubes v. Faber, 163 Wis. 89,
157 N.W. 519 (1916); Jaeger v. Stratten, 170 Wis. 579, 176 N.W. 61 (1920);
Ahola v. Sincock, 6 Wis. 2d 332, 94 N.W. 2d 566 (1958).

5 RESTATEMENT,

8RESTATEMENT,

ToRTs § 296 (1934).
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ation, the required standard of conduct is determined on the basis of
whether or not his actions were reasonable in such an emergency situation.
The determination of what is reasonable conduct by a doctor in an
emergency situation presents a difficult problem. The difficulty arises
from the reluctance of one doctor to testify against another doctor in
a malpractice case, commonly referred to as "the conspiracy of silence."
What is reasonable conduct on the part of a doctor is a standard that
can only be determined by the testimony of other doctors. Only in
cases where there has been a very flagrant violation of the standard of
care owed to the patient have doctors been willing to state that the
conduct of the fellow-practitioner has been such that he should be held
liable for malpractice. The foregoing would seem to indicate that the
probability of bringing a successful malpractice suit against a doctor
who gave emergency treatment to an accident victim would not be very
great. 9
There are other factors which also limit the possible success of
malpractice suits. Malpractice actions are based on negligence; thus,
all of the rules regarding the essential elements of actionable negligence
are applicable. 10 One of these elements is the placing of the burden of
proof on the plaintiff."" The case of Kuehnnernann v. Boyd" is a clear
statement of the fact that if a defendant doctor is to be held liable in
Wisconsin, the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to show that he
failed in the requisite degree of care and skill which is required of a
doctor. In practice, this has proved to be a very difficult burden to meet.
It appears to be at least arguable that an application of commonlaw malpractice rules would provide adequate protection to doctors
rendering treatment to victims of emergency situations. Thus, the need
of a "Good Samaritan" law becomes questionable.
There are, however, at least two sound arguments that are used to
point up the need for protection in addition to that afforded under the
common-law rules of malpractice. The first of these arguments relates to
the fact that it is not the successful malpractice suit that physicians primarily fear, but rather the very threat of a malpractice suit. The mere
fact that a doctor has been sued is often enough to do great harm to his
professional standing, and also cause him monetary loss due to a loss of
patients. These losses are apt to occur when it becomes known that the
doctor has been sued, and often are not overcome even though the suit
proves to be unsuccessful. If physicians fear to stop and treat the vki9 In Delahunt v. Finton, 244 Mich. 266, 221 N.W. 168 (1922), it was held that

the ordinary rules of negligence are not applicable to a surgeon performing
an operation in an emergency.
10 Davis v. Virginian Ry., 361 U.S. 354 (1960).
11 Halverson v. Zimmerman, 60 N.D. 113, 232 N.W. 754 (1930).
12 193 Wis. 588, 214 N.W. 326 (1927).

1964]

COMMENTS

tims of accidents, this reluctance is not due to the fear of being held
liable for malpractice, but rather to the possibility of being sued. Against
this possibility of being sued they feel that the "Good Samaritan" law
would prove to be a strong ally, as it would give them the procedural
advantage they are now lacking. Under the statute, the doctors are
granted immunity from suit by accident victims to whom they have given
"emergency care" at the scene of an accident. The proponents of the
statute feel that this immunity from the possibility of suit is necessary
if doctors are going to stop and render aid.
Secondly, advocates of the "Good Samaritan" law believe that the
protection it grants has been made necessary by a recent change in
malpractice law. This change has involved the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to malpractice cases. In the case of Fehrman
v. Smerl,1 3 the Wisconsin court held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
may be held applicable in a malpractice suit "where a layman is able to
say as a matter of common knowledge that the consequences of the
professional treatment are not those which ordinarily result if due care
is exercised."1 4 It is argued that this change lessens the plaintiff's burden
of proof in a malpractice case, and thus increases the possibility of
success in malpractice suits. Therefore, doctors treating the victims of
accidents should be given the additional protection of an immunity
statute. Whether or not this is a valid argument will depend on how
broadly the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will be applied in malpractice
cases. Fehrman seems to indicate that the application will be very
restricted.
Apparently, the Wisconsin legislature believed that the commonlaw protection against successful malpractice suits was not sufficient
to encourage doctors to treat accident victims, and thus it was decided
to give the doctors the procedural safeguard of immunity from suit
in the hope of attaining the goal of getting proper aid for accident victims. The soundness of this decision is subject to attack on the basis
of the dearth of cases involving malpractice suits brought against
doctors for treatment rendered at the scene of an accident.15 On the
other hand, the existence of a fear of malpractice suits in the medical
profession is strong proof of the need of the statute. Whether or not
the statute is going to bring additional help to accident victims is a
question that can only be answered by the passage of time.
Constitutionality
By enacting a law of this nature, it is possible that the legislature
has infringed on the constitutionally guaranteed rights of individuals.
13 20 Wis. 2d 1, 121 N.W. 2d 255 (1963).
14

Id. at 22, 121 N.W. 2d at 266.

15 Note, 41 NEB. L. REv. 609 (1961).
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Under article I, section 9, of the Wisconsin constitution, an individual
is guaranteed a remedy for an injury to his person:
Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all
injuries, or wrongs which he may receive to his person, property,
or character: he ought to obtain justice freely, without being
obliged to purchase it, completely and without delay, conformably to the laws.
Squaring sections 147.17(7) and 145.06(5) with this provision of the
Wisconsin constitution poses a difficult problem. In effect, Wisconsin's
"Good Samaritan" law says that one is not entitled to bring an action
for an injury caused him by a doctor or nurse, if the injury resulted
while he was being treated at the scene of an emergency, unless he can
prove the doctor or nurse was not acting in good faith. Generally, the
rights guaranteed by article I, section 9, of the Wisconsin constitution
have been zealously protected by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Diana
Shooting Club v. Lanoreum16 established that every violation by one
person of a legal right of another, impairing to any extent, however
slight, the enjoyment of that right, was an actionable wrong. In State
ex rel Wickhain v. Nygard,1 7 the court declared that article I, section
9, of the constitution was superior to any common-law doctrine in
existence when the constitution was enacted, as well as to any statute
enacted since the constitution's adoption. The "Good Samaritan" statute
appears to fly directly in the face of the rule of law laid down by these
two cases, and thus may be subject to the objection of being unconstitutional. The answer to this objection may be found in an evaluas
tion of what the statute actually does. In the case of State v. Diehl,
it was held that although a remedy may not be taken away altogether,
the state in the exercise of its police power may change or modify it,
provided some adequate remedy is left. Assuming the law to be a valid
exercise of police power, the question is then whether a remedy has
been extinguished or merely modified. It is certain that one no longer
has a remedy against a doctor or nurse who negligently treats him at
the scene of an emergency. However, one may still recover from the
party whose wrongful conduct was the cause of his original injury.
In other words, one still has a remedy, but the procedure he may use
in pursuing it has been limited. This argument of modification is subject
to the objection that if a person is the cause of his own original injury,
he is left with no remedy against a doctor or nurse whose negligent
treatment may have aggravated the original injury. Whether or not
the supreme court will accept this argument of mere modification is
something that can only be a matter of speculation at this time; how16

17
18

114 Wis. 44, 89 N.W. 880 (1902).
159 Wis. 396, 150 N.W. 513 (1915).
198 Wis. 326, 223 N.W. 352 (1929).
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ever, it is reasonable to conclude that if the argument is not accepted,
the constitutionality of the "Good Samaritan" law will be very doubtful.
If the law successfully meets the objection of extinguishment of
rights, it could still be subjected to the further argument of unconstitutionality on the grounds of ambiguity. The allegation of ambiguity
is illustrated by the many interpretation problems that will face the
court when it tries to apply the statute to varying fact situations.
Problem of Construction
When the courts of Wisconsin are called upon to interpret the
language of the "Good Samaritan" statute, they will be faced with two
alternatives. They may give the act the broadest possible interpretation
and application, or they may strictly construe it. Often when the courts
are faced with these alternatives, they are able to base their choice on
the legislative history of the act involved, but in the case of the "Good
Samaritan" law, this aid is not available. The bill was submitted to the
Assembly in the following form:
No person licensed under this section, who in good faith renders
emergency care at the scene of an emergency, is liable for any
civil damages as a result of acts or omissions by such person in
rendering emergency care.19
The bill was subjected to only four amendments in the Assembly. Three
of these were rejected. 20 The fourth became the second paragraph of
the bill, which defines the "scene of an emergency." 2' The bill was
passed by the Assembly by a forty-six to thirty-nine vote and was
sent to the Senate where it was passed unanimously. Thus, there is
very little in the legislative history of the law to help the courts in
interpreting and applying it.
As yet, there have been no cases interpreting similar statutes in
other jurisdictions. However, a clearer understanding of the new Wisconsin law may be gained by comparing it with similar statutes in other
states.
One of the first interpretive problems courts will be faced with is
that of defining what is meant by rendering emergency care in "good
faith." Nebraska's statute uses the words "gratuitously and in good
faith.
19
20

' 22

Since "gratuitously" is defined to mean "without valuable or

Bill No. 88A, Wis. Legis. (1963).

Amendment 1-A, which was temporarily laid aside, was a proposal to change
"scene of an emergency" to "highway." Amendment 2-A was a statement
to the effect that the protection of this section is not intended to, and does
not extend to, an existing doctor-patient relationship. Amendment 4-A called

for inserting "except for acts or omissions constituting gross negligence"

after the word omissions. These three amendments were rejected.
21 Proposed amendment 2-A read: "For purpose of this subsection, the scene
of an emergency shall be those areas not in the confines of a hospital or
other institution which has hospital facilities or a physician's office."
22 Neb. Laws 1961, ch. 110, at 349.
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legal consideration," 23 the problem of whether or not the doctor was
acting without the intention of seeking compensation may be posed in
an action attempting to deny the doctor the immunity of section 147.17(7) .-

In jurisdictions adhering to the doctrine of gross negligence, the
belief has been advanced that perhaps "good faith" covers all conduct
short of gross negligence.25 However, since Wisconsin has abolished
gross negligence, this could hardly be the legislature's intended definition of "good faith." 26 Perhaps "good faith" in the Wisconsin statute
will apply to all emergency treatment short of intentional misconduct.
In this regard, the Wisconsin courts will find Maine's "Good Samaritan" statute a very useful guide in defining "good faith." The Maine
statute requires "the exercise of due care." 27 A definition of what constitutes "good faith" under the new statute will be necessary in order
to make practical application of the law possible.
The Wisconsin courts will face a similar definitional problem when
they try to construe what is included under "emergency care." Practically speaking, the only persons who are qualified to define "emergency care" are doctors themselves. Thus, the scope (what constitutes
"emergency care") of this law which destroys an individual's remedy
is, in effect, to be established by the very persons whom it protects. This
may raise a very serious constitutional issue, but how else is the standard of what constitutes "emergency care" to be established? A possible
alternative would be to equate "emergency care" with the concept of
first aid treatment. But if this were to be the test, it would hardly seem
that doctors and nurses would be any more qualified to give this type
aid than any other person trained in first aid.
Applying the statute will also require an adequate definition of "the
scene of an emergency." The statute includes a definition of "scene of
an emergency,

' 2s

but this definition is so broad that some judicial in-

terpretation will be needed when the law is applied to concrete cases.
In this regard, it should be noted that Maine requires that treatment
take place at the scene of an "accident." 2 9 "Accident" is probably cap(4th ed. 1951).
For an interesting discussion of the possibility of a quasi-contract recovery
for reasonable value of services by a doctor, see Note, supra note 15. See
also Garvey v. Stadler, 67 Wis. 512, 30 N.W. 787 (1886).
25 Note, 1963 B. U. L. REV. 140 (1963).
28 Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W. 2d 105 (1961). In view of the
Bielski decision, it is hard to understand why thirty-seven members of the
Assembly voted in favor of Amendment 4-A to Bill 88 A, which amendment proposed adding "except for acts or omissions constituting gross negligence" to the bill following the word "omissions."
27 ME. REv. STAT. ch. 66, § 9-A (Supp. 1961).
28 For the purpose of this subsection, the scene of an emergency shall be those
areas not in the confines of a hospital or other institution having hospital
29 facilities, or a physician's office. Wis. Laws 1963, ch. 94.
ME. REv. STAT. ch. 66, § 9-A (Supp. 1961).
23

24
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able of being subjected to a more limited meaning than is "emergency."
The Massachusetts "Good Samaritan" law goes even farther and limits
the immunity to treatment at the "scene of a highway accident." 30
Statutes such as these may be used by the Wisconsin courts in limiting
"scene of an emergency" when they apply the "Good Samaritan"
statute.
Wisconsin courts will have little trouble in deciding who should
be granted immunity under the statute if they accept the phrase "persons licensed under this statute""' as conclusive of the legislative intent.
However, when the grant of immunity is viewed in light of a policy
of encouraging the rendering of aid in emergency situations, a broader
application of who should be given immunity may be deemed desirable.
This would be especially true if first aid type treatment were to be
the definition of "emergency care." In other states having "Good
Samaritan" statutes, various categories of persons have been included
under this section of the statute. All of the statutes immunize physicians and surgeons. The statutory law of South Dakota and Utah grants
osteopaths immunity. 32 California includes midwives in their immunity
section,33 and Texas and Wyoming go all the way, stating that "all
persons"

rendering aid in an emergency are immune from

suit. 34

Texas and Wyoming seem to grant the greatest incentive toward rendering aid at the scene of an emergency, but at the same time they completely destroy the remedy rights of an emergency victim and therefore are more susceptable to attack on a constitutional ground. Apparently, the Wisconsin legislature felt that exempting doctors and nurses
was an acceptable medium between the statutes at the two extremes;
namely, "physicians and surgeons only" and "all persons."
Other PracticalProblems
In addition to the aforementioned problems of language interpretation, several practical questions are certain to arise under the "Good
Samaritan" law. One can not help but wonder if a doctor who is called
to the scene of an emergency will be given the same immunity as a
doctor who just happens upon an accident. Is it really emergency care
when a doctor is called to the scene of an accident? What if a doctor is
called to a factory infirmary to treat an accident victim? An infirmary
usually lacks hospital facilities, but, factually speaking, such treatment
often is not emergency care. Also to be answered is the question of
how much treatment will a doctor be allowed to render under the "Good
Samaritan" statute and still be within the limit of rendering "emergency
MASS. GEN. LAWs ch. 112, § 123 (1962).
31 Wis. Laws 1963, ch.94.
32S. D. Laws 1961, ch. 317, at 681; UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-12-23 (Supp. 1961).
30

3CAL.

Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2144 (1961).

'.4 Texas Laws 1961, ch. 317, at 681; Wyo. STAT. ANN. 33-343.1 (Supp. 1961).
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care." Certainly, there is a point at which extensive treatment goes beyond "emergency care," and when this point is passed, the doctor should
once again become subject to the general rules and standards of conduct
relating to malpractice. In this regard, the limitation of the Wisconsin
statute to persons licensed under chapter 147 or 149 of the statutes may
be questioned. It appears that an out-of-state doctor is not immune
under our statute. Must a non-resident doctor act at the peril of a
malpractice suit because he is not licensed under chapter 147 of the
Wisconsin statutes? If this doctor is not protected by the statute, it is
questionable whether the purpose of the law of getting "qualified" persons to render aid at accidents is being fulfilled by its present wording.
This leads to another important consideration. Although a higher
standard of care may be required of doctors and nurses, are not police
officers and other persons who have been trained in rendering first aid
as qualified as doctors and nurses to render emergency treatment in the
form of first aid to accident victims? Yet they are not encouraged to
stop and render such care by the granting of immunity.
A question may also be raised concerning the fact that the immunity
granted by this statute is completely contrary to the recent judicial
trend in Wisconsin and throughout the country to extend tort liability. 35
Part of the rationale underlying these cases has been the idea that, by
abolishing the immunities, the burden of the cost of an injury is shifted
to the party best able to bear such cost. A "Good Samaritan" statute,
such as Wisconsin's, hardly seems to be in accord with such philosophy.
A disabled accident victim (part of whose disability may have been
caused by the negligent act of a doctor treating him) is certainly less
capable of bearing the loss of the disability than the physician (or his
liability insurer) who may have caused the disability. It seems reasonable that the physician should be required to pay the cost of the
disability, at least to the extent that his negligence contributed to aggravation of the injury. One cannot help but wonder whether or not
the immunity granted by the "Good Samaritan" law expresses a legislative intent contrary to the recently developing judicial policy of destruction of tort immunity. This thought is given credence by chapter
198 of the Wisconsin Laws of 1963 which limits the liability of a municipality to twenty-five thousand dollars for any single injury. 36 Since
this law was enacted subsequent to the Holytz case, 37 it might be taken
to indicate that the legislature wishes to place limitations on the judicial extension of tort liability.
35 Kojis v. Doctors Hospital, 12 Wis. 2d 367, 107 N.W. 2d 131 (1961) abolished
charitable immunity; Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.
2d 618 (1962) abolished municipal immunity; Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d
402, 122 N.W. 2d 193 (1963) abolished parental immunity.
36 Wis. Laws 1963, ch. 193.
3 Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, supra note 35.
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Conclusion
In enacting sections 147.17(7) and 149.06(5), the Wisconsin legislature has enacted a law which, at the very least, will prove to be controversial, especially with regard to its constitutionality. The law was
enacted for the apparent reason of encouraging qualified people; namely,
doctors and nurses, to render aid at the scene of an emergency. To
accomplish this purpose and to avoid attack on the ground that it is
ambiguous, it is necessary to give the law a very broad interpretation.
However, at the same time, the statute appears to infringe upon an
individual's rights to redress for wrongs done to his person. Thus, unless the statute is strictly construed, it will be vulnerable to attack on
the grounds of unconstitutionality. If the "Good Samaritan" law is to
be practically applied, the courts must solve this dilemma arising between a broad and a strict interpretation of the law. The fact that common-law malpractice concepts have not allowed unfair malpractice
suits against doctors who have rendered emergency treatment may well
be determinative when a case involving this law comes before the
supreme court, especially if it can be factually demonstrated that a
fear of such suits is unfounded. If physicians are given adequate protection by common-law rules, there is no need to give them additional
statutory protection at the expense of depriving injured individuals of
their constitutionally guaranteed rights.3 8 In view of their questionable
need and potentially broad scope, sections 147.17(7) and 149.06(5)
of the Wisconsin statutes, as they are presently worded, may well be
held to be unconstitutional if so challenged.
DAvm A. SUEMNICK

38 The general rule is that "there is no duty to answer the call of one who is

dying and might be saved nor . . . to play the part of a Good Samaritan and
fix the wounds of a stranger who is bleeding to death." Allen v. Hix~on, 111
Ga. 460, 360 S.E. 810 (1900), as cited by Professor Prosser in PRosseR, TORTS
184 (2d ed. 1955). Professor Prosser follows with this statement: "Moral revulsion against the general rule may eventually result in the legal imposition of
a legal duty on one to come to the aid of a fellow human in peril, so long as
little personal inconvenience is involved." If this type of legal philosophy
should continue to develop, it would certainly have some influence on the
court when they pass on the necessity of a "Good Samaritan" law.

